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ABSTRACT Assessing the security of IoT-based smart environments such as smart homes and smart cities
is becoming fundamentally essential to implementing the correct control measures and effectively reducing
security threats and risks brought about by deploying IoT-based smart technologies. The problem, however,
is in finding security standards and assessment frameworks that best meets the security requirements as well
as comprehensively assesses and exposes the security posture of IoT-based smart environments. To explore
this gap, this paper presents a review of existing security standards and assessment frameworks which also
includes several NIST special publications on security techniques highlighting their primary areas of focus
to uncover those that can potentially address some of the security needs of IoT-based smart environments.
Cumulatively a total of 80 ISO/IEC security standards, 32 ETSI standards and 37 different conventional
security assessment frameworks which included 7 NIST special publications on security techniques were
reviewed. To present an all-inclusive and up-to-date state-of-the-art research, the review process considered
both published security standards and assessment frameworks as well as those under development. The
findings show that most of the conventional security standards and assessment frameworks do not directly
address the security needs of IoT-based smart environments but have the potential to be adapted into
IoT-based smart environments. With this insight into the state-of-the-art research on security standards and
assessment frameworks, this study helps advance the IoT field by opening new research directions as well
as opportunities for developing new security standards and assessment frameworks that will address future
IoT-based smart environments security concerns. This paper also discusses open problems and challenges
related to IoT-based smart environments security issues. As a new contribution, a taxonomy of challenges
for IoT-based smart environment security concerns drawn from the extensive literature examined during this
study is proposed in this paper which also maps the identified challenges to potential proposed solutions.
INDEX TERMS Control measures, IoT-based smart environments, risks, security assessment frameworks,
security standards, taxonomy, threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is relatively a new and emerging
technology that is gaining popularity among many stakehold-
ers. According to [1] IoT technology has brought about rev-
olutionary impacts in many areas of our lives. Besides, it has
become a key enabler of innovation and success in a wide
range of fields including IoT-based smart environments [2].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Zheng Yan .
IoT has also paved the way for the emergence of other
IoT-based smart technologies which allow individuals to con-
nect and control smart devices and appliances remotely using
computers, smartphones, or tablets through the internet. Inter-
connected devices in an IoT-enabled smart environment allow
individuals to control different device functions remotely
through the internet [1]. However, it is common in a smart
environment to find both IoT, as well as other non-IoT devices
and services, blend to enhance the quality of life of people [3].
Connecting one’s devices and appliances to the Internet,
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however, exposes them as well as the data sensed, collected,
and exchanged by them to a wide range of security threats and
risks. Besides, every connected device can become a potential
entry or attack point for malicious intruders hence the need
for assessing and hardening IoT-based smart environments
security.
While IoT is still expected to impact many other upcom-
ing areas of our lives [4]; there are inherent security and
privacy concerns that need to be continuously addressed.
However, due to the dynamic, and heterogeneous nature
of IoT-based smart environments, addressing many of the
security and privacy issues is always a challenge. Security
assessment of IoT-based smart environments such as smart
homes and smart cities, for example, can be hard in environ-
ments where the status, posture, or security landscape, as well
as the extent of the network visibility is not known. What
makes security assessment in IoT-enabled smart environ-
ments even more challenging is the fact that once deployed
the type and nature of most interconnected IoT devices
or appliances rarely offer ongoing professional support to
individuals in either their design or operation phases [1].
The lack of ongoing professional support thus impacts
the security and privacy needs of many IoT-based smart
environments.
Confronted by the security challenges in IoT-based smart
environments, the authors in this paper conducted a review
of existing conventional security standards and assessment
frameworks highlighting their primary areas of focus to
uncover those that can potentially address some of the
security needs of IoT-based smart environments. A total of
80 ISO/IEC security standards, 32 ETSI standards and 37 dif-
ferent security frameworks which included 7 NIST special
publications on security techniques were reviewed. The find-
ings of this study can help IoT practitioners, researchers
and other stakeholders understand the state-of-the-art of the
domain as well as help them identify new research directions
and spark further discussions on the development of new
security standards and assessment frameworks to address
existing and future security problems in IoT-based smart
environments.
As a contribution, this paper thus aims to fulfil the follow-
ing objectives:
1) To review existing security standards and assessment
frameworks which include NIST special publications
on security techniques to uncover their primary areas of
focus and exposed the state-of-the-art and background
of the domain.
2) To identify and discuss open problems and chal-
lenges related to IoT-based smart environment security
concerns.
3) To propose and discuss a taxonomy of challenges for
IoT-based smart environment, drawn from the exten-
sive literature examined during this study, that also
maps potential solutions to the identified open chal-
lenges and other future IoT smart technologies security
issues.
As for the remaining part of the paper, section II presents an
overview and motivation for this study while the background
and existing research work are presented in section III.
Section IV explains the research methodology used in this
study followed by section V which presents reviews on
conventional security standards and assessment frameworks.
Section VI presents open problems and challenges related
to IoT-based smart environments. As a new contribution
section VII proposes and discusses a taxonomy of chal-
lenges for IoT-based smart environment in tandem with pro-
posed potential solutions to the identified challenges. Finally,
the paper concludes in section VIII and makes mention of
future research work.
II. OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION
This review was motivated by the understanding that conven-
tional security standards and assessment frameworks meant
for use in non-IoT environments are very different and many
may not directly address the needs of IoT-based smart envi-
ronments. This paper thus investigates the potentials that
conventional security standards and assessment frameworks
have in addressing IoT-based smart environments security
concerns by exposing their primary areas of focus as well as
the state-of-the-art and background of the domain.
While the benefits and prospects of an expanded IoT-based
smart environment are huge, so does the attack surface.
Consequently, an increased number of IoT devices, ecosys-
tems and integration has meant that many vulnerable end-
points are being witnessed daily, especially in smart homes,
smart cities, global enterprises, and critical infrastructures.
IoT-based smart environments are currently a trend that is
daily expanding, however, this expansion comes with a lot
of complexity, integration, and security issues in the different
areas of application. Because of these foregoing, a review
of existing conventional security standards and assessment
frameworks is positioned to uncover key and perennial secu-
rity issues in IoT-based smart environments.
Additionally, the authors note with concern that based on
the literature that has been reviewed in this paper, there is
still a deficiency of specialized security standards and assess-
ment frameworks that are primarily inclined to IoT-based
smart environments. For this reason, key discoveries and
conclusions in this study are explicitly based on leveraging
the content of existing conventional security standards and
assessment frameworks that are deemed to have the potential
to be used in IoT-based smart environments. This study also
identifies and discuss open problems and challenges while
at the same time proposing a taxonomy of challenges for
IoT-based smart environment mapping the identified chal-
lenges to potential solutions that can help address existing and
future IoT security issues.
Furthermore, based on the exploration and the review
conducted in this paper, it is evident that many existing or
proposed solutions have had a limited scope when exploring
security standards and assessment frameworks, however, this
study is explicitly not limited to security standards in general
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and consideration of assessment frameworks has also been
included to enrich the study as well as allow for broad and
in-depth findings. The combination of relevant literature in
security standards and assessment frameworks in this study
helps to avoid generalization and opens up this study to a
wider scope. Figure 1 shows an overview of the overlapping
key aspects that motivated this study which also forms the
primary focus areas of this paper.
FIGURE 1. Overview of the key aspects explored in this study.
The authors also acknowledge that the key aspects explored
in this study as shown in Figure 1 are not only applicable in
this study but can also be used in different IoT application
areas including those outside the scope of this paper. This
paper explicitly focused on existing conventional security
standards and assessment frameworks and their potentials to
be adapted to IoT-based smart environments. However, as a
key aspect, this paper also looked at different open problems
and challenges while at the same time proposing a taxonomy
of challenges mapped to potential solutions as highlighted
in Figure 1.
III. BACKGROUND AND EXISTING RESEARCH WORK
Like many other fields, the IoT domain is growing very
fast. However, with this growth comes many cybersecurity
challenges. Previous research in the IoT domain has mostly
focused on finding control measures to address deficiencies
in different areas of IoT including security, privacy, vulnera-
bilities, and resiliency [5]–[8]. However, the need for secu-
rity standards and assessment frameworks that specifically
focuses on IoT-based smart environments is also as important
as the research itself. As part of the background and existing
research work, this section will focus on the security and
privacy concerns for IoT-based smart environments as well as
existing research on security standards or assessment frame-
works. It is also important to note at this point that privacy is
not a primary focus of this study and is not explored further
beyond the background section.
A. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS IN IoT-BASED
SMART ENVIRONMENTS
In IoT-based smart environments, a lot of data and infor-
mation get shared among various devices. Without a good
security standard or security assessment mechanism in place,
the data and information moving in and around these environ-
ments can become susceptible or vulnerable to a variety of
security threats and risks [9]. Some of the concerns relating
to data and information in IoT-based smart environments as
discussed by [3], [5]–[12] are summarized in the subsections
below.
1) SECURITY CONCERNS
• Data and Information Leakage: In any IoT smart
environment, without proper security mechanisms that
protect data and information from malware and other
malicious intruders, personal information could easily
be leaked resulting in security breaches [11].
• Eavesdropping: With information moving in and
around IoT-based smart environments and over to the
Internet, malicious attackers can take advantage of unse-
cured network communications and steal data as it is
being transmitted between the connected IoT devices
which can lead to other serious security breaches.
• Hacking: Most of the data and information collected by
IoT devices within smart environments may be stored
on internet-accessible systems like the ‘‘Cloud’’. Many
cloud-based IoT devices and systems are known to have
security vulnerabilities and can easily be victims of
hacking and cyberattacks as data transmission like video
data from cameras may not even be encrypted when sent
over the internet.
• Software Exploitation:Because of the lack of standard-
ization in many IoT-based smart environments, rogue
software can easily find its way into IoT devices through
firmware upgrade and trusted boot, device acquisition as
well as apps and services. This can affect service deliv-
ery by altering device configurations. Besides, many
IoT devices run on autonomously lightweight versions
of the well-known operating system which hackers can
search for software vulnerabilities and exploit them to
gain privileged access to sensitive information [7].
• IoT Device Security: Because of the lack of specialized
universal approved IoT security standards or security
assessment frameworks, some devices may be manu-
factured with poor security baselines such as old and
unpatched embedded operating systems and software,
weak, guessable, or hard-coded passwords, insecure
data transfer and storage, among others. Thismakes such
IoT devices vulnerable to different security threats and
attacks.
• IoT Device Hijacking and Ransomware: As a result of
poor security, lack of specialized universal approved IoT
security standards, assessment frameworks, and rising
numbers in the use of IoT devices, many of these devices
may soon become easy targets of ransomware attacks.
• Technology Minded and Security Aware Users: With
the growing innovation of IoT technologies, many users
are yet to understand how modern IoT devices are
designed and function. This makes it easy for attackers
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to use social engineering to trick IoT device users into
providing sensitive data or information which can be
used to gain access into smart environment networks,
such as smart homes and smart cities, putting everyone’s
life at risk.
• Insufficient IoT Device Testing and Updates: Most
of the IoT devices are produced quickly to meet the
increasing market demands and hence do not undergo
proper testing or follow any acceptable security stan-
dards or assessment frameworks. Users mostly put their
trust in themanufactures to test the IoT devices as well as
provide security control measures. However, due to high
demands, many manufacturers focus more on creating
and releasing new products to the market without hav-
ing proper testing or putting security control measures
in place. Besides, old IoT devices may no longer be
updated or take long to be updated resulting in security
risks in IoT-based smart environments.
• Lack of Active Device Monitoring: Monitoring IoT
devices can be challenging [10]. This is because most
of the existing monitoring tools and practices especially
those focusing on the cloud were traditionally designed
to monitor time-series metric data with no focus on
modern IoT devices or their processes. Lack of active
IoT device monitoring tools makes it hard to have
full network visibility in IoT-based smart environments.
Besides, there exist a lack of such tools that can be used
to directly monitor individual IoT devices deployed in
IoT-based smart environments.
• Shortage of Efficient and Robust Security
Protocols: The lack of efficient and robust security pro-
tocols including proper IoT security standards, assess-
ment frameworks and safeguards could lead to security
breaches in smart environments leading to personal data
exfiltration [10], [13].
• Impersonation:With many IoT devices in smart envi-
ronments lacking strong authentication or access control
mechanisms, it becomes easy for intruders to imper-
sonate a legitimate user and use the credentials or any
other information that gives them access to existing IoT
resources in an IoT-based smart environment [7]. Suc-
cessful impersonation could further be used to escalate
other serious security attacks.
• Health and Safety of Users: If a hacker gains access to
an IoT-based smart environment such as smart homes,
he or she may, for example, try to change medical pre-
scriptions or order products that the homeowner does
not need or is allergic to. As a result, the health of the
homeowner and the entire family is at risk because they
may not have time to verify the automation processes
initiated by the hackers [14].
• Denial of Service (DoS/DDoS): With the advancement
in technology, hackers can try to cause a DoS/DDoS to
existing hubs in IoT-based smart environment networks
or the sensors themselves [7]. However, attackers can
also access the network and send bulk messages to IoT
devices such as Clear To Send (CTS) and Request To
Send (RTS) [11] causing DoS attacks to legitimate IoT
devices.
• Other Security Threats: With the rapid growth in the
number and usage of IoT devices, other security threats
may also exist in IoT-based smart environments such
as home invasions, trespass, falsification [11] rogue and
counterfeit IoT devices, botnet attacks, physical attacks,
unintentional damage or loss, disasters and outages,
failures or malfunctions, [3] dynamic systems, authen-
tication, unsecured wireless network problems [5],
side-channel attack, man-in-the-middle, identity theft,
advanced persistent threat (APT) [13], jamming, func-
tion creep, buffer overflow, large-scale unauthorized
data mining, surveillance, unauthorized access or dele-
tion or modification of data, worms, viruses and mali-
cious code [15], the openness of the networked systems,
weak passwords, fixed firmware [16], resource con-
straints, headless nature of IoT devices, tamper-resistant
packages, heterogeneous protocols, dynamic character-
istics, longevity expectations [17] among many other
security threats.
2) PRIVACY CONCERNS
Privacy in IoT-based smart environments according to [18]
means that ‘‘information about individuals must be protected
and should not be exposed without explicit consent from the
owners under any circumstances’’. Because of the ease of
connectivity of IoT devices to the internet, and the lack of
proper security mechanisms or common security standards
and assessment frameworks designed for IoT-based smart
environments, the risk of exposure of personal data or infor-
mation into the hands of malicious attackers can be high [10].
Some of the privacy concerns related to IoT-based smart
environments include:
• Data Storage and Usage: with the introduction of
cloud storage by third parties [19], [20] many IoT
devices can easily store generated or collected data
from smart environments in public cloud infrastruc-
ture. The problem, however, is that there is a lack of
standardization on how to store and process IoT data
from different sources that are mostly unstructured and
can lead to a breach of privacy. This, therefore, calls
for the development of universal security and privacy
standards, best practices, methods, and tools that can
consistently handle IoT data as well as ensure that dis-
tributed data is securely accessed and transported [21]
with high levels of privacy either to the public or private
clouds.
• Tracking and Location Privacy: Because of the ease
and availability of internet connectivity to IoT devices,
tracking users based on location is very common. Once a
malicious attacker identifies a user, they can collect data
that tracks the user behaviour [18] including location
history which the attacker can use to stalk a user leading
to a breach of privacy.
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• Context-Aware or Situational Privacy: As a result of
poor security mechanisms implemented in some IoT
devices, detecting, spotting, and locating users’ move-
ment, activities, and gathering data based on actions can
be possible [16] leading to a breach of privacy.
• Sensed, Generated or Collected Data Privacy: Some
manufactures of IoT devices can design their firmware
to collect data sensed or generated by the devices espe-
cially about the usage of services and other data about
their customers. The data or information collected in this
manner may not fully adhere to the privacy needs of the
users, especially during transmission and may lead to a
breach of user privacy.
• User Privacy Information Mining: Because of non-
fully protected network communication in IoT networks,
privacy mining as discussed by [22] can be used to mine
private information from smart homes or smart cities
leading to other serious security and privacy breaches.
• Other privacy concerns that have been identified in the
literature include user profiling, utility monitoring and
controlling [18], collection, use and disclosure of IoT
data without the users’ consent, de-identification of IoT
data, dependency on vendors, interoperability, manag-
ing IoT devices, accountability, and transparency [23].
As mentioned earlier, this paper will not discuss privacy
concerns further. The next section elaborates on some
of the existing research work on security assessment
frameworks.
B. EXISTING RESEARCH WORK
In literature, several security standards, assessment frame-
works, and special publications on security techniques exist
which can be used in different environments (e.g., net-
work security, world wide web security, applications secu-
rity, telecommunication among other areas). However, these
security standards and assessment frameworks were primar-
ily designed with specific application environments in mind
hence different steps or processes for different environments
are involved as highlighted later in section V. Researchers in
the IoT domain have also proposed different approaches and
techniques to address different IoT deficiencies and forms the
basis of the existing research work in this section.
In [24], the authors proposed IoT-based integrated home
security and monitoring system. The authors argued that
home security remains a critical issue hence the need for a
security and monitoring system for IoT-based smart home
environments. Their proposed system, however, focused on
detecting intruders, room temperature, humidity, rain, fire,
as well as monitor the light condition. The security of the
individual devices and the entire security landscape of the
smart home after device deployment was not considered in
their research which can leave the smart home vulnerable to
a variety of security threats and risks.
An end-to-end security assessment framework based on
Software Defined Network (SDN) to evaluate the security
level for CloudIoT was developed by [25]. Their study
was motivated by the existence of numerous choices of
cloud-resource providers and IoT devices and not neces-
sarily IoT-based smart environments. Their research stated
that evaluating the security levels of both the cloud-resource
providers and IoT devices is very important in promoting the
adoption of CloudIoT and reduce business security risks [25].
The current paper, however, focuses on reviewing security
standards and assessment frameworks to identify those that
have the potential to address IoT-based smart environments
security concerns.
Another study by [26] argued that security has become
a vital factor for any IoT smart environment. For this rea-
son, they proposed in their research an Identified Security
Attributes (ISA) framework to evaluate the security features
of the Internet of Health Things (IoHT) based devices in the
healthcare environment. Their study was motivated by the
understanding that fragile patient’s data always moves from
IoT devices to servers. During transmission, patient’s data can
fall into the hands of malicious attackers. For this reason,
their study concluded that proper security is indispensable
for IoHT based equipment due to their exposure to different
security attacks [26].
Research by [27] stated that the rapid growth of IoT-based
systems raises security concerns making a security assess-
ment framework for IoT systems imperative. The authors then
proposed an assessment framework to evaluate the security
features of IoT-based equipment using hybrid multi-criteria
decision making (MCDM) methodology and later carried out
an empirical study on the assessment of IoT-based healthcare
devices [27].
More research by [28] claimed that patient’s data is very
critical and so is its secure transmission in smart healthcare
applications. In their research [28] proposed a framework
to protect medical information from external threats which
the authors claim has both scientific as well as economic
significance as it consumes less possible resources of low-
powered medical devices; thus, it could be used for real-time
healthcare applications.
In another research, the authors in [29] state that ‘‘in
inventory automation, real-time check on items, their infor-
mationmanagement, and statusmanagement, monitoring can
be carried out using IoT’’. However, the data that flows
among the devices in the network demands a security assess-
ment framework that ensures authentication, authorization,
integrity, and confidentiality. For this reason, the authors
proposed ‘‘a lightweight IoT-based security assessment
framework for inventory automation using wireless sensor
networks [29].
Research by [30] proposed a secure and compliant contin-
uous assessment framework for evaluating the security and
compliance levels of cloud services. The proposed frame-
work facilitates cloud service to customers to select an opti-
mal cloud service provider (CSP) who satisfies their desired
security requirements. However, the framework also enables
cloud service customers to evaluate the compliance of the
selected CSP in the process of using cloud services [30].
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Research by [31] designed and implemented a risk assess-
ment framework for cloud service providers meant to pro-
vide assurance that will lead to higher confidence of cloud
service consumers on one side and cost-effective and reli-
able productivity of cloud service providers and resources
organized by individual infrastructure providers on the other
side.
Denning et al. [32] proposed a framework for evaluating
security risks associated with technologies used at home.
On the same note, Kang et al. [33] proposed an enhanced
security framework for smart devices in a smart home envi-
ronment meant to provide integrity using self-signing and
access control techniques for preventing security threats
such as data modification, leakage, and code fabrication.
Table 1 below provides a summary of the existing work
discussed and their primary focus areas.
TABLE 1. Existing research work and their primary focus areas.
Infer from the summarized research works in Table 1 that
most of it does not directly focus on providing secu-
rity assessment for IoT-based smart environments, but only
specific application areas thus do not fully cater for all
the primary security needs of IoT-based smart environ-
ments. Table 1 further justifies the need for developing
new security standards and assessment frameworks for
IoT-based smart environments. The next section discusses
the research methodology used to conduct the review in this
paper.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In conducting the review process, the authors in this paper
adopted the guidelines and principles that shows systematic
methods that uphold the theoretical validity of the study.
These guidelines pinpoint the need for identifying the key
study area, sampling, extracting useful data and interpreting
the validity of these data and finally mapping the outcome
as potential results. Based on the same notion, this study
primarily focused on identifying the relevant articles on secu-
rity standards and assessment frameworks including NIST
special publication on security techniques, examining them
to find whether they satisfy the suggested selection criteria
and disseminating the findings while identifying the existing
research gaps or challenges as is shown in Figure 2. The
review methodology used in this study comprises of three
primary phases as follows:
• Phase I: Study area identification, the definition of
research questions, sampling and defining the key search
strategy or criteria.
• Phase II: Applying the search strategy or criteria
to known literature, conducting snow bowling search,
database search, evaluating the search and defining the
selection criteria.
• Phase III: Identifying the accepted literature, articles,
papers, websites and web documents for review and
reviewing based on the selected key study topic.
A. PHASE I: STUDY AREA IDENTIFICATION
Study area identification in the context of this paper was
based on several research questions that also formed the basis
of the whole study. Given that the objective is to review the
current state of the art of security standards and assessment
frameworks, this holds as the guiding principle that shows
the key activities that could be leveraged for IoT-based smart
environments. Based on this objective the key research ques-
tions for this study have been coined as follows:
• RQ1: What is the current state of the art of conven-
tional security standards and assessment frameworks
with regards to IoT-based smart environments security
concerns?
• RQ2: Which of the existing conventional security stan-
dards and assessment frameworks can be adapted to help
address some of the primary security requirements of
IoT-based smart environments?
• RQ3:What are the open problems and challenges based
on the existing exceptions in the security standards and
assessment frameworks?
Basing our study on the above-mentioned research ques-
tion, the next phase addresses the key search strategy.
B. PHASE II: SEARCH STRATEGY
The second phase is based on conducting an online
search. The scope of this study has been inclined towards
security standards and assessment frameworks which also
include NIST special publications on security techniques.
121980 VOLUME 9, 2021
N. M. Karie et al.: Review of Security Standards and Frameworks for IoT-Based Smart Environments
FIGURE 2. Research methodology.
As a result, the authors explored Google Scholar, ACM,
Springer Link, IEEE Xplore, Web of Science, Web Search
Engines and Scopuswith the queries and search strings shown
in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Queries and search strings used.
After conducting a keyword search based on the criteria
mentioned in Table 2, the number of papers, online articles,
web documents and other special publications obtained is
summarized in Table 3.
C. PHASE III: IDENTIFYING AND REVIEWING THE
LITERATURE
To filter the selected papers, online articles, and special pub-
lications the following approach was adopted:
TABLE 3. Total number of resources identified based on the search
criteria.
• The paper, article, websites, web document or other
special publications are only included in the next phase
when all the authors agree that they hold some relevance
based on the study objectives.
• Doubted papers, articles, websites, web documents or
any other special publications are jointly reviewed to
show if they satisfy the selection criteria in part or fully
as shown in Figure 2.
• Papers, articles, websites, web documents or any spe-
cial publications considered not to be relevant by all
the authors were deleted or removed from the selection
criteria.
• All accepted papers, articles, websites, web documents
and special publications were included in a repository
ready to be reviewed.
During this phase, all the gathered literature, 831 in total
was subjected to thorough readings by the authors with two
objectives in mind: the first objective was to extract all the
relevant data needed for our study while the second objec-
tive was to check for the correctness and relevance of the
extracted data. The information considered from each litera-
ture was inclined towards the primary objectives of this study.
After reviewing the titles, abstracts, and sections of all the
831 identified literature resources shown in Table 3, a total of
617 literature resources were deemed irrelevant and excluded
from the selection criteria. Of the 214 that remained, 131were
categorized as doubtful. Consultation and discussions formed
the basis of this process especially on any agreement and
consensus to bemade on any of the literature under contention
or categorized as doubtful. After many considerations based
on the content of each paper, article, websites, web documents
and other literature resources, a total of 149 data items were
extracted from the accepted literature that was deemed rel-
evant by the authors which included, 80 ISO/IEC security
standards, 32 ETSI standard and 37 different security assess-
ment frameworks (including 7 NIST special publications on
security techniques). The 149 identified data items formed the
final repository for review and are summarized in Table 4.
The next section presents a review of all the selected secu-
rity standards and assessment frameworks including theNIST
special publications on security techniques. This section aims
to uncover the primary focus area of each of the security stan-
dard and assessment frameworks identified and selected from
the literature to find out which of them potentially addresses
some of the security requirements or needs of IoT-based smart
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environments and if not, can be adapted to handle IoT-based
smart environments security concerns.
V. REVIEW OF EXISTING SECURITY STANDARDS AND
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS
Existing security standards offer insight into recommended
security controls, processes, procedures, baselines, and
guidelines that are deemed ideal for networks and in some
cases mandatory for compliance [34]. Most existing security
assessment frameworks, on the other hand, offer security
best practices, methods and guidelines that organizations can
embrace to get the best results for implementing a success-
ful program [34]. However, IoT-based smart environments
networks raise new security concerns that are not directly
addressed by most of the existing conventional security stan-
dards and assessment frameworks [3]. This section of the
paper, therefore, reviews the existing security standards and
assessment frameworks including some NIST special publi-
cations identified and selected from the reviewed literature
highlighting their primary areas of focus to uncover those that
can potentially be adapted to address the security needs of
IoT-based smart environments.
A. EXISTING SECURITY STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENT
FRAMEWORKS
Table 4 shows a summary of the different security standards
and assessment frameworks identified, selected and discussed
in this section including the owner and the primary focus
area of each standard and framework. Note also that some
of the standards and assessment frameworks discussed in
this section are specialized by industry or geographic region.
A more detailed description of each identified standard and
assessment framework is given in the sub-section to follow.
1) NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK
The NIST cybersecurity framework was created based on
a set of industry standards and best practices to help orga-
nizations manage their critical infrastructure cybersecurity
risks [35]. Because IoT is becoming a part of critical infras-
tructure, this framework has the potential to be used in
IoT-based smart environments. The framework consists of a
set of cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative ref-
erences that are common across critical infrastructure sectors,
offering detailed guidance for developing individual organi-
zational profiles. Specifically, the framework is broken down
into five key functions (identify, protect, detect, respond,
and recover) that manage the risks to data and information
security [36].
• Identify: Helps organisations develop an understand-
ing of how to manage cybersecurity risk to systems,
people, assets, data, and capabilities [37] including
asset management, business environment, and informa-
tion technology governance through comprehensive risk
assessment and management processes.
TABLE 4. Summary of existing security standards and assessment
frameworks, methods, and guidelines.
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TABLE 4. (Continued.) Summary of existing security standards and
assessment frameworks, methods, and guidelines.
• Protect: Helps organisations develop and implement
appropriate safeguards to ensure the delivery of critical
services [37]. This phase also includes defining security
controls for protecting data and information systems
including access control, training and awareness, data
security, information protection procedures, and main-
taining protective technologies [31].
• Detect: Helps organisations develop and implement
appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
cybersecurity event [37] as well as offering guidelines
for detecting anomalies in security, monitoring systems,
and networks to uncover security incidences [36].
• Response: Helps organisations develop and imple-
ment appropriate activities to act regarding a detected
cybersecurity incident [37]. This also includes recom-
mendations for planning responses to security events,
mitigation procedures, communication processes dur-
ing a response, and activities for improving security
resiliency [36].
• Recovery: Helps organisations develop and implement
appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience
and to restore any capabilities or services that were
impaired due to a cybersecurity incident [37] as well
as guidelines that a company can use to recover from
attacks [36].
2) NIST RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF)
The Risk Management Framework (RMF) [38] provides
a comprehensive, flexible, repeatable, and measurable
7-step process (prepare, categorize, select, implement, assess,
authorize, and monitor) that any organization can use to
manage information security and privacy risks.
• Prepare: Takes care of the essential activities to pre-
pare an organization for managing security and privacy
risks.
• Categorize: Helps an organisation to categorize the sys-
tem and information processed, stored, and transmitted
based on impact analysis.
• Select: Helps organisations select the set of NIST SP
800-53 [39] controls to protect the system based on risk
assessment.
• Implement: Helps an organisation implement the con-
trols and document how controls are deployed.
• Assess: Helps an organisation in assessment to deter-
mine if controls are in place, operating as intended, and
producing the desired results.
• Authorize: This involves senior officials in an organisa-
tion making risk-based decisions to authorize the system
(to operate).
• Monitor: Helps an organisation to continuouslymonitor
control implementation and risks to the systems.
With the growing security and privacy concerns in
IoT-based smart environments, this framework has the poten-
tial to be adapted for use in function-specific areas of IoT
security and privacy risks management.
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3) NIST PRIVACY FRAMEWORK
The NIST privacy framework was developed to help orga-
nizations identify and manage privacy risks as well as build
innovative products and services while protecting individu-
als’ privacy [40]. The core functions of the framework are as
below:
• Identify: Help organisations develop an understanding
of how to manage privacy risks for individuals arising
from data processing.
• Govern: Help organisations develop and implement
the organizational governance structure to enable
an ongoing understanding of the organization’s risk
management priorities that are informed by privacy
risk.
• Control: Help organisations develop and implement
appropriate activities to enable them or individuals to
manage data with sufficient granularity to manage pri-
vacy risks.
• Communicate: Help organisations develop and imple-
ment appropriate activities to enable them as well as
individuals to have a reliable understanding of how data
are processed and associated privacy risks.
• Protect: Help organisations develop and implement
appropriate data processing safeguards.
From this framework, the identify, control, and protect
functions can help manage privacy issues in IoT-based smart
environments.
4) NIST SP 800-53
This special publication on security matters provides security
and privacy controls for information systems and organiza-
tions [39] to protect organizational operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation from a
diverse set of security threats and risks, including hostile
attacks, human errors, natural disasters, structural failures,
foreign intelligence entities, and privacy risks.
5) NIST SP 800-30
This special publicationwas developed to guide organisations
in conducting information systems risk assessments [41].
6) NIST SP 800-37
The NIST SP 800-37 special publication describes and pro-
vides guidelines for applying the RMF to information sys-
tems and organizations [42].
7) NIST SP 800-39
This special publication was developed to guide an inte-
grated, organization-wide program for managing information
security risk to organizational operations (mission, functions,
image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the opera-
tion and use of federal information systems [43].
8) NIST SP 800-12
NIST SP 800-12 [44] was primarily designed for federal and
governmental agencies but can also be used by others focus-
ing on control and computer security within an organization.
9) NIST SP 800-14
The NIST SP 800-14 [45] provides general descriptions
of commonly used security principles to help organizations
understand cybersecurity policies [36].
10) NIST SP 800-53R1
NIST SP 800-53R1 [46] was designed with a focus on pro-
tecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
system and its information.
11) HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA)
HIPAA was developed to provide guidelines for enabling
health plans, health care providers and health care clear-
inghouses to implement sufficient controls for securing
employee or customer health information and protect sensi-
tive patient health information from being disclosed without
the patient’s consent or knowledge [82]. With the growing
number of wearable IoT medical devices, HIPAA can be
adapted for use in IoT-based smart health systems.
12) FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT
(FERPA)
FERPA was developed to protect the privacy of student edu-
cation records [47] and applies to all schools that receive
funds under an applicable program of the U.S. Department
of Education [47].
13) PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY DATA SECURITY
STANDARDS (PCI-DSS)
PCI DSS was designed to help protect the safety of card
data [48] and defines a set of requirements intended to
ensure that all organisations that process, store, or transmit
credit card information maintain a secure environment [49]
to reduce credit card fraud. With the increasing usage of
near field communication, PCI-DSS can be enforced in IoT
devices such as smartphones that are sometimes used for
processing credit card information.
14) CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION
(CMMC)
Developed by the United States Department of Defence
(DoD), CMMC is used to measure defence contractors’ capa-
bilities, readiness, and sophistication in cybersecurity [50].
The cybersecurity maturity model provides a framework or a
pathway for organizations to periodically assess or measure
the maturity of a security program and guidance on how to
reach the next level [51].
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15) CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL (C2M2)
Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
C2M2 enables organizations to voluntarily measure thematu-
rity levels of their cybersecurity capabilities consistently [52].
16) FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION
COUNCIL (FFIEC) CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL
Like the CMMC and C2M2, the FFIEC Cybersecurity
Assessment Tool (FFIEC-CAT) is meant to help organisa-
tions identify their cybersecurity risk level and determine the
maturity of their cybersecurity programs. The assessment tool
provides a repeatable and measurable process for financial
institutions to measure their cybersecurity preparedness over
time [53] as well as to measure risk levels across several
categories, including delivery channels, connection types,
external threats, and organizational characteristics [54].
17) NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
CORPORATION (NERC) 1300
Developed by NERC, this standard is meant to help organi-
sations in reducing risks to the reliability of the bulk electric
systems from any compromise of critical cyber assets [55].
18) NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY
CORPORATION CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION (NERC-CIP)
The NERC-CIP standards were developed to provide specific
guidance on cybersecurity for the North American power
systems. A list of all the applicable standards is available
at [56]. The increasing use of smart inverters and other IoT
devices in electricity distribution companies can benefit from
adapting both NERC 1300 and NERC-CIP standards
19) AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE
(ANSI)/INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF AUTOMATION
(ISA) (ANSI/ISA 62443)
The ANSI together with the ISA developed ANSI/ISA
62443 which is part of the IEC 62443 international series
of standards on industrial communication networks – infor-
mation technology security for networks and systems. This
standard defines processes, techniques and requirements for
Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) and
includes secure product development lifecycle requirements
meant to help in developing and maintaining secure prod-
ucts [57]. IoT device manufacturers can benefit from the use
of ANSI/ISA 62443 in their product development lifecycle
and help produce secure IoT products.
20) GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR)
The GDPR was designed for the European Union and
imposes data privacy and security obligations onto organiza-
tions anywhere, so long as they target or collect data related
to people in the EU [58]. This may also be adapted to suit
specific environments where IoT devices are used to collect
and distribute data related to individuals.
21) SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLS (SOC2)
Designed by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA),
SOC2 enable organizations that collect and store personal
customer information using cloud services to maintain
proper security as well as security requirements to which
vendors and third parties must conform [36]. SOC2 reports
are meant to protect the needs of users requiring detailed
information and assurance about the controls at a service
organization relevant to security, availability, and process-
ing integrity of the systems the service organization uses to
process users’ data and the confidentiality and privacy of
the information processed by these systems [59] which may
also include IoT-based smart systems. Also, SOC2 provides
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) companies with guidelines and
requirements for mitigating data breach risks and strengthen-
ing their cybersecurity postures [36].
22) THREAT ASSESSMENT AND REMEDIATION ANALYSIS
(TARA)
TARAwas developed as part of aMITRE portfolio of systems
security engineering practices that contribute to the achieve-
ment of mission assurance for systems during the acquisi-
tion process [60]. TARA primarily focuses on identifying
and assessing cyber vulnerabilities and selecting counter-
measures effective at mitigating those vulnerabilities. The
capabilities of TARA can easily be adapted for IoT-based
smart environments to help in identifying and assessing cyber
vulnerabilities.
23) OPERATIONALLY CRITICAL THREAT, ASSET, AND
VULNERABILITY EVALUATION (OCTAVE)
OCTAVE was developed by the Software Engineering Insti-
tute at Carnegie Mellon University on behalf of the U.S
Department of Defence to help in identifying and managing
information security risks [61]. It is anchored on three basic
aspects: build asset-based threat profiles, identify infrastruc-
ture vulnerabilities, and develop a security strategy and plans.
OCTAVE defines a comprehensive evaluation method that
helps an organization to identify the information assets that
are important to the organization, the threats to those assets,
and the vulnerabilities that may expose those assets to the
threats. OCTAVE also helps organisations understand what
information is at risk [61].
24) INFORMATION ASSURANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM
ENTERPRISES (IASME) GOVERNANCE
Developed by the IASME consortium, the IASME gover-
nance standard is used to accredit a business’s cybersecu-
rity posture [62]. The standard includes such areas as, risk
assessment and management, monitoring, change manage-
ment, training and managing people, backup, and incident
response and business continuity. There were suggestions for
the IASME consortium to deliver IoT certification to give
confidence to consumers and businesses that IoT devices
have attained a minimum accepted level of security [63].
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25) HEALTH INFORMATION TRUST (HITRUST)
TheHITRUSTAlliance developed a framework that is a com-
bination of the Department of Defense (DoD) Cybersecurity
MaturityModel (CMMC) framework and theNewYork (NY)
DOH Office of Health Insurance Programs. HITRUST-CSF
primarily focuses on security and privacy issues in
organisations [64].
26) CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY V7 (CIS V7)
Developed by the CIS, CIS v7 helps organisations to enhance
their security standards [65] by listing actionable cyberse-
curity requirements for enhancing security standards in all
organizations [36].
27) CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR INFORMATION AND
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES (COBIT)
COBIT [66] was developed by the Information Systems
Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and focuses on IT
security, governance, and management in organizations that
want to improve product quality and, at the same time, adhere
to enhanced security best practices [36].
28) NZISM PROTECTIVE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (PSR)
FRAMEWORK
Developed by the New Zealand government the framework
is part of the National Security Intelligence Service’s Pro-
tective Security Requirements (PSR) and outlines the gov-
ernment’s expectations for managing personnel, physical and
information security including the baselines and minimum
mandatory security standards for government departments
and agencies [67].
29) COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS (COSO)
COSO of the Treadway commission is dedicated to develop-
ing frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management,
internal control, and fraud deterrence [68]. Among the frame-
works developed under the COSO umbrella are:
• Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework:
This framework addresses the evolution of enterprise
risk management and the need for organizations to
improve their approach to managing risk as well as meet
the demands of an evolving business environment [68].
• Internal Control-Integrated Framework: This frame-
work helps organizations design and implement internal
controls [68].
30) AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS DIRECTORATE (ASD)
ESSENTIAL 8
Developed by ASD in collaboration with the Australia
Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Essential 8 is meant to
help organisations protect their systems against a range of
adversaries [69].
31) 10 STEPS TO CYBERSECURITY
This is an initiative of the National Cyber Security Cen-
tre (NCSC) in the UK and provides 10 steps of general
guidance on how organisations can protect themselves in
cyberspace [70].
32) TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CYBER SECURITY (TC
CYBER) FRAMEWORK
TC CYBER developed a framework [71] that recommends a
set of requirements for improving privacy awareness for indi-
viduals or organizations as well as improving the telecom-
munication standards across countries located within the
European zones [36]. TC CYBER initiatives are split across
9 key areas where standardization can help bring better
security [71] which are understanding the cybersecurity
ecosystem, protection of personal data and communication,
consumer IoT security and privacy, cybersecurity for critical
national infrastructures, network security, cybersecurity tools
and guides, direct support to EU legislation, and quantum-
safe cryptography.
33) NEW ZEALAND PRIVACY ACT 2020
Developed by the parliamentary counsel office in
New Zealand the Privacy Act 2020 promote and protect
individual privacy [72].
34) CONSORTIUM FOR IT SOFTWARE QUALITY (CISQ)
CISQ develops security standards meant for developers to
maintain when developing software applications [73] as well
as assess the risks and vulnerabilities present in completed
software applications or those under development. Develop-
ers use the CISQ standards to measure the size and quality of
their software programs [36].
35) FEDERAL RISK AND AUTHORIZATION MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (FedRAMP)
FedRAMP developed a framework to provide a standardized
approach to security authorizations for cloud service offer-
ings [74]. The framework can enable government agencies
to evaluate cyber threats and risks to different infrastructure
platforms, cloud-based services, and software solutions [36].
36) FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MODERNIZATION
ACT (FISMA)
Developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA), FISMA [75] is aimed at helping federal
agencies implement adequate measures to protect critical
information systems from different types of attacks as well
as help them develop and maintain highly effective cyberse-
curity programs [36].
37) SECURITY CONTENT AUTOMATION PROTOCOL (SCAP)
OpenSCAP developed the SCAP standard with a focus on
automated configuration, vulnerability and patch checking,
technical control compliance activities, and securitymeasure-
ment [76]. SCAP aims to standardize the processes through
which security software programs communicate security
issues, configuration information, and vulnerabilities [36].
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38) ETSI STANDARDS
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) is a nonprofit organisation dedicated to producing
telecommunications standards that can be used throughout
Europe.1 However, ETSI also develops standards for dif-
ferent areas of cybersecurity and the Internet of Things
(IoT). Because of the vast number of standards developed by
ETSI, in this section, we sample some of those that focus
on addressing some components of cybersecurity and the
Internet of Things (IoT). For a comprehensive list of all the
ETSI standards, the reader is advised to consult [71] and [82].
To be in line with the objectives of this study, Table 5 sum-
marizes sampled ETSI standards and their primary focus
areas either touching on cybersecurity or the IoT-based smart
environments like smart cities, smart grids, smart metering,
smart body area networks and Smart Cards.
TABLE 5. Summary of ETSI standards.
The next section presents a summary of the ISO/IEC
27000 Series of standards on information technology secu-
rity techniques identified to support this study and shown
in Table 6.
B. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANISATION (ISO)
27000 SERIES
Developed jointly by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
1https://www.etsi.org/standards
Commission (IEC) the ISO/IEC 27000-series of standards
shown in Table 6 is a collection of published standards as
well as others under development (as at the time of this
study) related to information technology, security techniques,
privacy, incidence response and risk management that can
be used across a wide range of types and sizes of business
organisations.
The summary presented in Table 6 shows different stan-
dards in the ISO/IEC 27000 family in tandem with their
primary focus areas [77]. Note that of all the 80 ISO/IEC
27000 series of standards identified in this study only 8 which
is 10% of all the standards have a direct focus on IoT security
and privacy with 5 published and 3 under development at the
time of this study.
As is evident from Table 6, the ISO/IEC 27000-series of
standards are broad in scope and cover a variety of areas
including privacy, confidentiality, integrity, availability, tech-
nical information technology and other cybersecurity areas.
However, a good number of the standards also cover informa-
tion technology and security techniques. All the 80 ISO/IEC
27000-series standards listed in Table 6 apply to organiza-
tions of all sizes especially in assessing and mitigating cyber
security and information risks. It is also important to note
at this point that the ISO/IEC 27000-series of standards are
continuously updated to be in line with the dynamic nature of
cybersecurity as well as the ever-changing security threats,
vulnerabilities and other impacts of cyber security incidents.
For a compressive discussion of the individual standards
listed in Table 6, the reader can consult [77]. Discussing
and evaluating individual standards is outside the scope of
this study, however, future research may consider individual
discussions and evaluations of specific standards identified.
Table 6 at this point again justifies the need to develop new
standards and assessment frameworks focusing on IoT-based
smart environments as only 10% of the listed standards
have a direct focus on IoT security and privacy. This is
because most of the security standards and assessment frame-
works identified in this paper were not designed to directly
address the security needs of IoT-based smart environments.
This is arguable because of the dynamic nature of digi-
tal technology. For this reason, new security standards and
assessment frameworks will need to be developed to specifi-
cally address the security needs of IoT-based smart environ-
ments. The next section briefly explains open problems and
challenges related to IoT-based smart environments security
issues.
VI. OPEN PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR IoT-BASED
SMART ENVIRONMENTS
This section provides a brief description of open problems
and challenges related to IoT-based smart environments secu-
rity concerns. However, the problems and challenges can also
be considered as potential areas for future research directions.
Some of the open problems and challenges identified are
briefly discussed below.
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TABLE 6. Summary of existing security standards.
A. LACK OF STANDARDIZATION
The lack of standardized approaches that can scale beyond
conventional network requirements into IoT-based smart
TABLE 6. (Continued.) Summary of existing security standards.
environments presents a major challenge in developing and
implementing IoT security control measures. Researchers
and other stakeholders should consider developing new
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TABLE 6. (Continued.) Summary of existing security standards.
security standards and assessment frameworks to address
both current and future IoT security concerns.
B. TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION
Technology evolution makes IoT devices function smoothly
as standalone systems or part of existing solutions to improve
the life and quality of IoT devices users. However, manyman-
ufactures of IoT devices do not incorporate security designs
and make use of different protocols and technologies that
create complex configurations in IoT-based smart environ-
ments. Standards and assessment frameworks needed to be
developed to streamline the way different IoT technologies
are designed, manufactured, and implemented.
C. SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Security and privacy are inherent challenges to many IoT
application domains. The hacking of IoT devices is causing
serious security and privacy challenges that have the potential
to drag into the unforeseeable future of IoT. With new IoT
devices being manufactured daily and added into existing
networks, their connectivity to the internet providesmalicious
actors with an entry point to smart environments where they
can carry out their malicious activities, especially since many
of the IoT devices suffer from known security loopholes. Poor
security and privacy can expose people’s lives as well as their
health to malicious individuals through hack attacks.
D. CONNECTIVITY
With new IoT devices entering the market daily, connectivity
issues are becoming a challenge as well. New communication
models, protocols and technologies need to be developed to
support the tens, hundreds and thousands of new devices
being connected to the internet daily.
E. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATIONS
Being relatively a new technology, the Internet of things
presents legal issues in different jurisdictions with regards to
applicable laws and regulations. For a detailed account [78]
and [79] present in their research, some of the legal and
ethical issues associated with IoT smart environments.
F. OTHER IoT CHALLENGES
Other challenges found in the literature include compatibility,
interoperability, scalability, intelligent analysis and actions,
reliability, management of IoT network and its resources, data
confidentiality and visualization [80]. As a new contribution,
the next section presents the proposed taxonomy that classi-
fies the different challenges related to IoT smart environments
and their proposed potential solutions.
VII. TAXONOMY OF CHALLENGES FOR IoT-BASED
SMART ENVIRONMENT AND PROPOSED
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In this section, we present a taxonomy of challenges for
IoT-based smart environments in tandem with proposed
potential solutions. Figure 3 shows a high-level overview of
the different IoT-based smart environment challenges dis-
cussed in this section.
A. SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED TAXONOMY
Fundamentally, the taxonomy in this section has been drawn
from the examined literature in this paper. The taxonomy was
VOLUME 9, 2021 121989
N. M. Karie et al.: Review of Security Standards and Frameworks for IoT-Based Smart Environments
FIGURE 3. IoT-based smart environment challenges.
necessitated by the existence of key security and privacy chal-
lenges in IoT-based smart environments. Logically, while the
key considerations could be inclined on the security of data,
devices and key technologies being utilized, our study was
inclined to the relevant considerations (methods/techniques)
in IoT-based smart environments that are centred on handling
security and privacy as well as how the data that is generated
in these environments are managed securely. These insights
have been considered while combing through the existing
security standards and assessment frameworks. Furthermore,
they formed a foundation that has enabled effective and
systematic exploration of security standards and assessment
frameworks which in the long run have also been used to
define the scope of the taxonomy as well as a baseline for
identifying open problems and challenges that are relative to
IoT-based smart environment.
With many known challenges in IoT-based smart environ-
ments, attempts have been made to address specific chal-
lenges by different stakeholders. The contribution in this
paper is, however, an exceptional effort in the direction of
a taxonomy of challenges for IoT-based smart environments
based on the examined literature in this paper. The scope of
the taxonomy is, thus, restricted to the literature reviewed
by the authors in this study. It is also important to note that,
the various challenges identified and discussed in this paper
are not, in whatever way an exhaustive list, however, the
taxonomy was created taking into consideration the major
challenges associated with IoT-based smart environments as
shown in Figure 3. The next section explains the proposed
taxonomy in this study.
B. PROPOSED TAXONOMY OF CHALLENGES FOR
IoT-BASED SMART ENVIRONMENT
The proposed taxonomy is an extended version of the differ-
ent categories of challenges shown in Figure 3. Table 7 shows
the details of the different challenges drawn from the
reviewed literature in this paper. The taxonomy consists
of five different categories of challenges arranged from
top to bottom with the first one being the technical chal-
lenges. This is followed by the legal challenges, ethical
challenges, operational challenges, and finally the adaptive
challenges.
The sub-sections to follow briefly explains the various
categories of the IoT-based smart environment challenges
shown in Table 7. However, it is also important to note at
this point that, the various sub-categories of the challenges
shown in the second column of Table 7 focusmore on specific
challenges associated with each category. To simplify the
understanding as well as present specific finer details of the
proposed taxonomy, the authors organized the taxonomy into
categories and sub-categories as shown in Table 7. Besides,
when developing specialized IoT security tools that focus on
addressing the individual but specific IoT challenges, the sub-
categories can be useful. Also, note that most of the sub-
categories of the challenges shown in Table 7 were only
selected as common examples to facilitate this study and do
not in any way represent an exhaustive list. To improve on
the list of the specific sub-categories of the challenges to each
named category, more research still needs to be done.
1) TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
In this paper, we view technical challenges as those that
can be addressed using existing knowledge, expertise, and
resources. They are easy to identify, define and their solution
are based on known experts’ knowledge and skills. Imple-
menting the solutions to any of the identified technical chal-
lenges often falls to someone with the knowledge, expertise,
and authority to do so. Examples of technical challenges
faced by IoT-based smart environments identified for this
study are shown in column two of Table 7.
2) LEGAL CHALLENGES
Legal challenges are related to legal specifics and may
include both civil and criminal aspects. Several legal chal-
lenges affect IoT-based smart environments. Stakeholders
note with concern, for example, how service providers use,
store and secure users’ personal information. Users and man-
ufacturers of IoT devices, therefore, need to be aware of the
legal challenges highlighted in Table 7, their complications
and also understand that there are no concrete answers to
them yet.
3) ETHICAL CHALLENGES
Many ethical challenges may arise from deploying IoT
devices and services. Ethical challenges present people with
tough choices of what is good or bad, what is acceptable or
not acceptable among other choices. Usually, ethical chal-
lenges are hard to resolve in a manner that is consistent
with accepted ethical guidelines. This is because they present
difficult situations, especially when onemust choose between
two or more options yet neither of their choices resolves
the situation ethically. Table 7 lists some of the examples of
ethical challenges identified for this study.
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TABLE 7. Taxonomy of challenge for IoT-based smart environment and
their proposed potential solutions. TABLE 7. (Continued.) Taxonomy of challenge for IoT-based smartenvironment and their proposed potential solutions.
4) OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
With the growing number of IoT devices and their deploy-
ment in different smart environments, operational challenges
are bound to occur. In an environment where IoT devices
and services are deployed, operational challenges are those
that could create waste, drain resources, impact operational
performance, render a business less profitable and hinder
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growth. Different categories of operational challenges have
been identified as examples to support this study and are
shown in Table 7.
5) ADAPTIVE CHALLENGES
Unlike technical challenges, adaptive challenges as shown
in Table 7 are difficult to identify. These type of challenges
presents people with situations that have no known solu-
tions [81]. In some cases, there may be too many solutions
for a single adaptive challenge with no clear choice as well.
Adaptive challenges are by nature, adaptive. This implies
that they are complex, ambiguous unpredictable, volatile,
fluid and change with circumstances [81]. Resolving adaptive
challenges sometimes require people to learn new ways of
doing things, change their attitudes, values and norms and
adopt experimental mindsets [81].
Based on the general description of the challenges iden-
tified in this study and the small space in column three of
Table 7, the proposed potential solutions for each category
are listed separately in the next section and numbers i to xi.
Note also that some of the proposed solutions apply to more
than one category of the challenges as captured in column
three of Table 7.
C. PROPOSED POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE
IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES
IoT devices are becoming important components in deploy-
ing different types of services in smart environments. To over-
come the different challenges described in this paper, this
section presents proposed potential solutions that can help
protect IoT-based smart environments and ensure services
continuity and stability in future deployments. The proposed
solutions include:
i. Developing security assessment frameworks for
IoT-based smart environments to secure the IoT
network.
ii. Developing IoT device-specific monitoring tools.
iii. Implementing secure authentications for all IoT
devices.
iv. Encrypting IoT data moving in and out of IoT-based
networks (Encrypted communication).
v. Testing all IoT hardware before, during and after
deployment (Testing IoT hardware).
vi. Use public key infrastructure security methods for IoT
devices and smart environments.
vii. Developing and deploying only secure and trusted IoT
applications.
viii. Implementing identity management.
ix. Trust establishment for secure data transmission and
object authentication.
x. Hardening the security of the IoT networks including
the use of strong login credentials.
xi. Regulating and certifying IoT devices before use to
avoid launching IoT devices in a rush.
Note that every IoT device introduced into any network can
be vulnerable to a variety of cyberattacks. The proposed
solution identified above can help prevent potential future
attacks in IoT-based smart environments. However, other IoT
security solutions that can also be beneficial include the
use of:
• IoT security analytics,
• End-to-end credentials
• IoT API security methods,
• Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools
• Dedicated network visibility tools and finally
• Keeping up to date with the latest IoT security threats
and breaches
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Knowing that the security standards and assessment frame-
works that can be deployed in IoT-based smart environments
are quite different from those that can be used in non-
IoT domains, the need for effective security standards and
assessment frameworks for IoT-based smart environments is
now inevitable. This is backed up by the fact that IoT-based
smart environment security is dependent on a wide range
of security checks which many existing security standards
and assessment frameworks discussed in this study may not
directly address. Besides, the security of IoT-based smart
environments is determined by the installations and config-
urations made largely by sometimes untrained individuals.
A combination of all these challenges makes the security
of IoT-based smart environments much more difficult to
develop, implement, enforce, and maintain. To address these
challenges, this paper reviewed 80 ISO/IEC security stan-
dards, 32 ETSI standards and 37 different conventional secu-
rity frameworks which included 7 NIST special publications
on security techniques. The review process revealed the lack
of security standards and assessment frameworks that directly
addressed the security requirements and needs of IoT-based
smart environments.
As a new contribution, this paper proposed a taxonomy that
classifies the different challenges related to IoT-based smart
environments into a few well defined and easily understood
categories drawn from the literature examined by the authors
in this study. The taxonomy also included proposed potential
solutions to the identified challenges. Such a taxonomy can
help researchers and other stakeholders identify and formu-
late future research directions related to the security and
privacy issues of IoT-based smart environments. As part of
the future work, the authors plan to developed and test an
IoT-based smart environment security assessment framework
in a simulated smart environment and assess its effectiveness
and efficiency based on some of the challenges identified in
this study. In addition, it is the authors view that in future
research we will explore how the current taxonomy would
translate and fit in other environments given the changing and
dynamic nature of the IoT-based ecosystems. However, more
research still needs to be done to improve on the work con-
ducted in this study as well as spark further discussions into
the development of new security standards and assessment
frameworks for IoT-based smart environments.
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